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TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS
Morris D. Forkosch"
T HE RECENT ATTEMPTS to amend the federal Constitution so as
to alter, procedurally and substantively, the treaty-making
powers, while unsuccessful, have nevertheless served an excellent
purpose, namely, to impress upon the country what has long been
a neglected feature of our federal system. For lawyers especially,
the Great Debate of 1954 should be understood, both in its historic
and legal significance. This short essay, therefore, is designed to
present various legal facets of the overall and the particular
problems involved, first from the procedural, and then from the
substantive, treaty points of view, concluding with a discussion of
the just-rejected attempts to change both of these.
I. THE TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE
Numerous writers' and newspaper columnists, but apparently
not the President of the United States, 2 refer to the Senate's
* LL.B., LL.M., St. John's University School of Law; J.S.D., New York Uni-
versity; Ph. D. (Econ.), Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research.
Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Author, A Treatise on Labor Law (The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., Indianapolis, 1953).
1 Even Mr. Justice Davis, in Haver v. Yaker, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 32 at 35, 19 L.
Ed. 571 at 573 (1870), wrote: "In this country, a treaty is something more than a
contract, for the Federal Constitution declares it to be the law of the land. If so,
before it can become a law, the Senate, in whom rests the authority to ratify it,
must agree to it." Italics added.
2 For example, President Eisenhower sent various treaties of friendship to the
Senate. as with Sen. Ex. 0., 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., involving Japan, and, in his
message of transmittal, began: "With a view to receiving the advice and consent
of the Senate to ratification...." This is standard State Department language
and apparently desires that the Senate consent to ratification by the President.
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"ratification" of a treaty. The Senate itself, in much the same
way, provides that "Treaties transmitted by the President to the
Senate for ratification shall be" taken up in a certain way. s
Procedurally, however, the federal Constitution, when dealing with
the powers of the President, 4 grants to him power, "by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur."5 The Constitution,
therefore, speaks of the "advice and consent" of the Senate in
making treaties, provided two-thirds "concur." Ratification, by
that precise term, is not mentioned. When the Senate does "ad-
vise and consent," a simple majority of a quorum is sufficient to
vote on amendments and reservations, whereas concurrence is by
a two-thirds vote of a quorum. 6 Since the Senate is composed of
ninety-six Senators, a majority for simple voting purposes, and
for the two-thirds rule mentioned above, can be simply calculated,
i. e., twenty-five and thirty-three, respectively, at least.
With the noting of these linguistic and mathematical points,
it is proper to turn to the question of where, and how, "ratifica-
tion" enters into the treaty-making procedure. There are, in
brief, four stages, namely: negotiation, submission, concurrence,
and ratification, but it should be pointed out that it is only in the
third of these stages that any Senate "advice and consent" may
take place.
7
s See Senate Rule XXXVII.
4 The President, and his office, powers, duties, etc., have been examined in great
detail by numerous authorities, some of whom are: Corwin, The President, Office
and Powers, 3d Ed.; Hart, The American Presidency in Action; Hyman, The
American President; and Laski, The American Presidency, An Interpretation.
5 U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6 Both votes are taken under U. S. Const., Art. I, § 5, which reads: "A Majority
... shall constitute a Quorum to do Business."
7 See generally, Wilcox, The Ratification of International Conventions (1935).
Lecturing in 1907, Woodrow Wilson, later to become president, stated: "One of the
greatest of the President's powers I have not yet spoken of at all; his control, which
is very absolute, of the foreign relations of the nation. The initiative in foreign
affairs, which the President possesses without any restriction whatever, is virtually
the power to control them absolutely. The President cannot conclude a treaty with
a foreign power without the consent of the Senate, but he may guide every step of
diplomacy, and to guide diplomacy is to determine what treaties must be made, if
the faith and prestige of the government are to be maintained. He need disclose no
step of negotiation until it is complete, and when in any critical matter it is com-
pleted the government is virtually committed. Whatever its disinclination, the
Senate may feel itself committed also." Wilson, Constitutional Government in the
United States (1908), p. 77 et seq.
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A. NEOOTIATION
In 1936, in the famous case of United States v. Curtiss-Wriqht
Export Corporation," Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote that the
President "alone negotiates [treaties]. Into the field of negotia-
tion, the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless
to invade it.' ' Historically, however, as the learned Justice knew,
the original draft of the Committee of Detail in the Federal Con-
vention of 1787 provided that "the Senate . . . shall have power
to make treaties. . . ."0 The clause finally adopted, quoted above,
therefore assumes Senate "advice and consent" in the making,
i. e., negotiating treaties, and Washington, in the days when both
the founding fathers and he knew at first hand what was intended,
personally appeared before the Senate, with his advisers, for
advice during the negotiation period. 1 The consequences, galling
to the high office of the Chief Executive, dissuaded all succeeding
presidents from repeating this "mistake." Since 1816, when the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations became a standing com-
mittee, other presidents have utilized this medium for such pur-
pose, when and if so desired. -12 As Jefferson put it, the "trans-
action of business with foreign powers is executive altogether,"
and this principle of politics has now become translated into a
rule of law.
8 299 U. S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 (1936).
9 299 U. S. 304 at 319, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed. 255 at 262.
10 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1911), Vol. II, p. 183.
11 See Hayden, The Senate and Treaties 1789-1817 (1920), pp. 21-7, who details
the facts concerning Washington's first, and only, visit to the Senate chamber, "to
advise with them on the terms of a treaty to be negotiated with the Southern
Indians." See also Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents 1789-1902 (1905), Vol. I, p. 61. His experience made Washington say,
when he left the Senate chamber, that "he would 'be damned' if he ever came there
again." Hayden, op. cit., p. 23.
12 Woodrow Wilson felt that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 intended the
relations of the President and Senate "to be very much more intimate and confi-
dential than they have been; that it was expected that the Senate would give the
President its advice and consent in respect of ... treaties in the spirit of an execu-
tive council associated with him upon terms of confidential cooperation rather than
in the spirit of an independent branch of government. . . The Senate has shown
itself particularly stiff and jealous in insisting upon exercising an independent
judgment upon foreign affairs, and has done so so often that a sort of customary
modus 1vivendi has grown up between the President and the Senate, as of rival
powers.... [T]he President is expected to be very tolerant of the Senate's rejection
of treaties, proposing but by no means disposing even in this critical chief field of
his power." Wilson, op. cit., p. 138 et seq.
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B. SUBMISSION
Assuming negotiations have been satisfactorily concluded, the
President forwards the proposed treaty to the Senate for concur-
rence. 13 In theory, the Senate has advised and consented, so that
concurrence should be little more than an idle gesture but, as the
actual advice and consent may have involved no more than a
handful, or perhaps a majority, of the Committee members,
whereas concurrence requires a two-thirds vote, further action is
needed. The act of concurrence is assumed to be one involving a
degree of considered deliberation and of cautious voting but, as
the Senate debates will evidence, this unfortunately has not always
been the case.
C. CONCURRENCE
With respect to concurrence itself, the Senate may do one of
several things. It may (1) concur unconditionally by at least a
two-thirds vote of a quorum;14 (2) reject unconditionally by a
vote of one more than one-third of a quorum; (3) amend by a
simple majority vote of a quorum; or (4) attach reservations,
adopted by a simple majority vote of a quorum, to its two-thirds
vote of concurrence. The first and second are self-explanatory
and, if the first occurs, the President thereafter proceeds as in
the next stage set out below. An amendment adopted by a majority
vote would operate to alter the treaty itself, so the document
would have to be returned to the President who could either reject
13 See note 2, ante, for the style of the Presidential message. David Lawrence,
in a Washington dispatch dated Feb. 2, 1954, points out that the President is "under
no obligation contained in the Constitution to submit any international agreement
or treaty to the Senate at a particular time. He can wait a month or four years
and his successor can continue indefinitely to ignore the ratification process of the
Senate."
14 This vote need not be recorded by yeas or nays, hence a voice vote, often by a
handful of Senators, may suffice to consent to a treaty. As pointed out below, this
procedure has been criticized by the proponents of the constitutional amendment
hereinafter mentioned. However, Senate Rule XXXVII, which prescribes the
method to be followed in voting on a treaty, specifies that, by a simple majority
vote, the procedure may be changed so as to force a roll-call on every treaty up for
consent. This Rule may even provide for a two-thirds vote of the entire Senate,
totalling 64 instead of a quorum, i. e., 33; or, separately or in addition, provide that
the same two-thirds or majority vote may also state whether the treaty is to be
self-executing or non-self-executing by an amendment or reservation which now can
be added by a majority vote.
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the amendment and refuse to proceed further, thereby dropping
the treaty,15 or else seek to obtain the consent of the other party
to the "contract" or to re-negotiate in the light of the Senate's
amendments.16  A reservation, by contrast, does not alter the
treaty but limits the obligations of this government under it,
thereby permitting the President to proceed to the next stage
mentioned below, i. e., ratification. If the other party dislikes the
reservation, or reservations, there is no international reason why
the treaty may not be rejected or otherwise denounced by it.
Generally, however, an amendment is utilized when only one
nation is the other contracting party, whereas reservations are
used when more than one such nation is so involved.
Perhaps the outstanding illustration of this Senate ability to
amend or to reserve a treaty to death may be observed in the
1919 debate over the Treaty of Versailles which gave birth to the
League of Nations although, since 1789, the Senate has rejected
or modified 28% of some 1,224 submitted treaties. With reference
to that illustration, ex-President Taft cabled President Wilson,
then in Paris, to have certain principles included in the clauses
of the Covenant for the League but, a draft having already been
agreed upon, the other nations desired to make additional amend-
ments if Wilson so proposed to do. The latter, therefore, felt
constrained to strike personal bargains to comply with Taft's
suggestions and yet not re-open the Covenant. Nevertheless, the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ultimately recommended
forty-five amendments and four reservations, to become the famous
Lodge reservations which had first numbered fourteen. A series
15 See, for example, the Hay treaties of 1904-5, providing for the general arbi-
tration of international disputes and requiring each nation to "conclude a special
agreement defining" the dispute, etc. The Senate approved the British treaty but
substituted "treaty" for "agreement," whereupon Theodore Roosevelt refused to
proceed further, holding the Senate action to be tantamount to rejection. Article 43
of the United Nations Charter speaks of special agreements to be made by the
member nations, undertaking to make available to the Security Council men, mate-
rial, and the like, to preserve the peace. The Charter was consented to by the
Senate without any change of language. To date, of course, no such agreements
have been entered into as the Korean War did not involve forces thereunder. The
United Nations Participation Act of Dec. 20, 1945, authorizes the President to
negotiate such agreements: 22 U. S. C. § 287 et seq., particularly § 287d.
16 See concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brown in Fourteen Diamond Rings v.
United States, 183 U. S. 176 at 183, 22 S. Ct. 59, 46 L. Ed. 138 at 143 (1901).
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of three Senate votes in 1919, and one in 1920, rejected the Treaty
without these reservations. The 1920 presidential campaign found
the Democratic platform somewhat ambiguous concerning the
reservations, and that of the Republican Party even more so. The
Harding landslide was interpreted as a mandate against the
League, which thereby died a natural (political) death for the
United States, and separate peace treaties with the defeated
nations were ratified the following year.
17
D. RATIFICATION
The Senate, as has been seen, may concur unconditionally,
whereupon, in theory, the President should, but query if he must,
ratify. If he should refuse, the judiciary would probably not
mandamus him to act for his is a political act, although this ques-
tion of enforcement has never materialized. Impeachment, of
course, might be the answer, but this would depend upon fac-
tors yet unknown. It would seem, therefore, that the President,
in the final analysis, has the last say concerning the existence
or non-existence of a treaty although, for practical purposes, it
would be the Congress which may, or may not, ultimately breathe
life into it by the power of the appropriation purse.' If uncon-
ditional rejection by the Senate has occurred, there could, of
course, be no ratification by the President. Senate amendments,
as has been seen, require re-submission and re-negotiation, if nec-
essary, while reservations permit immediate presidential ratifi-
cation but subject to the other party's right to reject or denounce.
17 The story of the Wilson-Lodge struggle has been told by numerous writers.
See, for example, Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (1942), Ch. 34,
and Fleming, The United States and the World Court (1945), Ch. 2.
Is Washington, in 1792, desired to negotiate with Algiers to ransom American
captives of the Barbary pirates. Secretary of State Jefferson suggested that appro-
priations would require House consent, hence he urged sanction by the entire
Congress for the treaty. Washington nevertheless put the matter to the Senate
alone and the House later made the money available. It did, however, in 1796, when
Washington requested money to effectuate the Jay treaty, set forth its money
authority in the record, saying: "When a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of
the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend,
for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by Congress.
And it is the constitutional right and duty of the House of Representatives, in all
such cases, to deliberate on the expediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and
to determine and act thereon as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the
public good." See Annals, Vol. 5, p. 771 (April 6, 1796), and p. 782 (April 7, 1796).
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Again, this does not mean that these procedures must be initiated
by the President. If dissatisfied with either or both of these last
Senate actions, he could drop the entire matter, thereby relieving
the other party from any obligations.
The foregoing description and analysis of the involved and
cumbersome treaty-making power 9 discloses, to an extent, just
how extended or limited the power actually is, both in theory and
in practice. The President may propose, but not alone may the
Senate dispose, for the House may thereafter refuse to appropri-
ate funds to effectuate existing treaties. Furthermore, as with
the Russian Treaty of 1911, the Congress may insist upon its
power of abrogation; or, as in 1939, the "area within which the
president might maneuver" may be clearly limited by the impli-
cations of existing legislation, as was the case with respect to
the Neutrality Act of 1937.20
II. THE EFFECT OF THE TREATY
Under the "supremacy" clause of the Constitution, a ratified
treaty becomes, as with Congressional legislation, the supreme law
of the land,21 although it is not a legislative act but more nearly
a contract between two or more nations.2 2 In other words, it is
legislation adopted by a procedure different from that ordinarily
thought of, but, as will be seen below, may be on a higher level. 23
It may operate within the nation as such law in and of itself,
that is, be self-enforcing, or it may require Congressional legis-
19 Laski, op. cit., p. 189, says: "The truth is that the treaty-making power dis-
plays the whole American scheme of government at its worst. It multiplies all the
difficulties that are inherent in the separation of powers ...
20 Laski, op. cit., p. 172.
21 U. S. Const., Art. VI.
22 In Foster v. Neilson, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 253 at 314, 7 L. Ed. 415 at 436 (1829),
Chief Justice Marshall said that a treaty is nevertheless "to be regarded in courts
of justice as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act-
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the
Legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court."
23 A statute must be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution in order not to run
afoul of that document, but a treaty need only be made "under the authority of the
United States." This was carefully pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri
v. Holland, 2952 U. S. 416 at 433, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 at 647 (1920).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
lation to become law if it is of the non-self-enforcing or executory
type. It may contain provisions which confer rights upon indi-
viduals, thereby partaking of the nature of internal law, capable
of being enforced between private parties within the country,
24
or be non-private in character.
With regard to treaties of the self-enforcing type, reference
might be made to the 1783 treaty of peace between Great Britain
and the United States which was construed, in the case of Ware
v. Hylton,25 to operate as a nullification of a Virginia statute,
thereby permitting a British creditor to sue a Virginia debtor
who had, in reliance on the local statute, paid the debt to the state
and had received a discharge of the debt from it. Treaties may
also work to supersede state laws of limitation which bar collec-
tion of a debt after a stated period of time,26 state laws concern-
ing rights of aliens to inherit property,27 and the like.28
Suppose, however, that a treaty conflicts with a provision of
the United States Constitution or contradicts the terms of a fed-
eral statute. Which, then, governs? In the first of these situa-
24 "A treaty is primarily a compact between independent Nations. It depends
for ... enforcement ... on the interest and the honor of the governments. . . . But
a treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens
or subjects of one of the Nations residing in the territorial limits of the other, which
partake of the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as
between private parties in the courts of the country." Edye v. Robertson (Head
Money Cases), 112 U. S. 580 at 598, 5 S. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798 at 804 (1884). See
also United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 1J. S. (1 Cranch) 102 at 110, 2 L. Ed. 49 at
51 (1801).
25 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568 (1796).
2 6 In Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U. S. (3 Cranch) 454, 2 L. Ed. 497 (1806), the same 1783
treaty provision with Great Britain was held to prevent the operation of a Virginia
statute of limitations designed to bar the collection of existing debts.
27 See, for example, Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483 at 489-90, 25 L. Ed. 628
at 630 (1880), and Boyd, "Treaties Governing the Succession to Real Property by
Aliens," 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1001 (1953).
28 See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U. S. (7 Cranch) 603. 3 L. Ed. 453
(1813), as Interpreted in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U. S. (1 Wheat.) .304, 4 L.
Ed. 97 (1816), and the case of Asakura v. City of Seattle. 265 U. S. 3.32. 44 S. Ct.
515, 68 L. Ed. 1041 (1924). While the case of Terrace v. Thompson. 263 U. S. 197,
44 S. Ct. 15, 68 L. Ed. 255 (1923), permitted California to exclude Japanese aliens
from owning real estate because the treaty there invoked did not cover the claimed
rights, the United States Supreme Court in Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633,
68 S. Ct. 269, 92 L. Ed. 249 (1948), felt that the "equal protection clause" of the
Fourteenth Amendment served to shield these persons from the strictures of the
state law. In this, the California Supreme Court later agreed: Sel Fujii v.
California, 38 Cal. (2d) 718, 242 P. (2d) 617 (1952). Where a treaty provision does
cover the situation, as in the case of the German nationals protected under the 1923
treaty, contrary state laws must fall: Clark v. Allen, 331 U. S. 503, 67 S. Ct. 1431,
91 L. Ed. 1633 (1947).
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tions, the United States Supreme Court has indicated, albeit the
language is obiter, that the treaty would be ineffective29 although
it has never had a case before it in which it could so hold.30 In
the latter situation, a self-executing treaty would serve to repeal
earlier conflicting federal3 l and state3 2 enactments, but Con-
gress, despite the treaty, could thereafter pass conflicting legis-
lation, subject to a presidential veto, which would then super-
sede the treaty.33  In other words, as is true of other statutory
enactments, the latest particular treaty or law would win out,
3 4
subject to a judicial determination as to whether or not an am-
biguous treaty is, or is not, self-executing in character.3 5 Congress
may, in this fashion, see fit to repeal a clause or two in a self-
29 DeGeofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258 at 267, 10 S. Ct. 295, 33 L. Ed. 642 at 645
(1890), and Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525 at 541, 5 S. Ct. 995,
29 L. Ed. 264 at 270 (1885). In New Orleans v. United States, 35 U. S. (10 Pet.)
662 at 736, 9 L. Ed. 573 at 602 (1836), the Jeffersonian view was expounded with
the court saying: "Congress cannot by legislation enlarge the federal jurisdiction
nor can it be enlarged under the treaty-making power." See, however, the subse-
quent discussion in connection with the case of Missouri v. Holland, post, at note 42.
30 See United States v. Thompson, 258 F. 257 at 260 (1919). There Is respectable
argument that such a question, one dealing with the constitutionality of a treaty, is
a political one and "not subject to judicial inquiry or decision." Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 at 302, 38 S. Ct. 309, 62 L. Ed. 726 at 732 (1918);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 at 319, 57 S. Ct. 216,
81 L. Ed. 255 at 262 (1936). When examined, however, these cases, and others not
here cited, are seen not to be directly in point. See also the decisions from Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568 (1796), to United States v. Reid, 73 F.
(2d) 153 (1934), to the effect that it is "doubtful whether the courts have the power
to declare the plain terms of a treaty unconstitutional."
31 On this, see United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L. Ed.
49 (1801) : Foster v. Neilson, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 253, 7 L. Ed. 415 (1829) ; United
States v. Percheman, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 51, 8 L. Ed. 604 (1833) ; and Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386 (1888). Compare with
Willoughby, Constitutional Law (1929), Vol. 1, p. 555.
32 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U. S. (3 Dali.) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568 (1796); Hauenstein v.
Lynham, 100 U. S. 483, 25 L. Ed. 628 (1880). Municipal ordinances will also fall:
Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U. S. 332, 44 S. Ct. 515, 68 L. Ed. 1041 (1924).
33 See Cherokee Tobacco v. United States, 78 U. S. (11 Wall.) 616, 20 L. Ed. 227
(1870); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 456, 31 L. Ed. 386 (1888);
Botiller v. Dominiquez, 130 U. S. 238, 9 S. Ct. 525, 32 L. Ed. 926 (1889) ; Bas v.
Tingy, 4 U. S. (4 Dali.) 37, 1 L. Ed. 731 (180). In Moser v. United States, 341
U. S. 41, 71 S. Ct. 553, 95 L. Ed. 729 (1951), Mr. Justice Minton said the Supreme
Court was not "doubting that a treaty may be modified by a subsequent act of
Congress." Treaties terminable on notice, or which have lapsed, are not here
discussed.
34 Mr. Justice Field, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S. 581 at 600,
9 S. Ct. 623, 32 L. Ed. 1068 at 1073 (1889), put the point tersely when he wrote:
"In either case the last expression of the sovereign will must control."
35 Compare Foster v. Neilson, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 253, 7 L. Ed. 415 (1829), with
United States v. Percheman, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 51, 8 L. Ed. 604 (1833). See also
Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of America (1953), in Sen. Doc. 170,
82nd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 418.
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executing treaty without thereby terminating the treaty, although
the other party might then see fit to do so. For that matter, if
Congress wished, it might denounce an entire treaty.
3 6
If, on the other hand, the treaty is executory, i. e., of the non-
self-enforcing type, affirmative legislation by Congress would be
required before it could be enforced within the nation. Such a
treaty, or any right resting thereon, would not per se form a part
of internal law and could not until Congress acted to make it so.
But, and here is an important question, would Congress have any
choice in the matter? Put differently, as the treaty would then be
part of the supreme law of the land, would it then be supreme
even over Congress, so that Congress must pass such legislation?
Or, does the "supremacy" clause of Article VI lump the constitu-
tion, laws "made in pursuance thereof," and "treaties made .
under the authority of the United States" into one "supreme
law of the land?" The preceding paragraph has given the law
upon this phase of the discussion, but what of appropriations to
carry treaty clauses and agreements into effect? Here a differ-
ent question is presented, for it is not a question of validity or
legislation per se but of purse strings, and this problem is, as yet,
unresolved.
3 7
36 Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13,799 (1855) Edye v. Robertson, 112 U. S.
580 at 598, 5 S. Ct. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798 at 804 (1884) ; La Abra Silver Mining Co. v.
United States, 175 U. S. 423 at 460, 20 S. Ct. 168, 44 L. Ed. 223 at 236 (1899). See
also Laski, op. cit., p. 167: "Negotiation is the prerogative of the president; but the
treaty is binding upon the citizens of the United States only with the consent of the
Senate. There is a sense, also, in which the relation of the House of Representatives
to a treaty is important; for no money can be raised to complete its Implementation
without the consent of that house.... Congress, and above all the Senate, [is not to]
be prejudiced constitutionally in the exercise of its powers in its own [treaty
consent] sphere, by what the president has done in his."
37 It is here assumed that no internal "law" need be legislated but, for enforce-
ment of the treaty provisions, funds must be supplied. Since U. S. Const., Art. I,
§ 9, says that an appropriation is required before funds can be withdrawn from
the Treasury, and the Congress must pass the appropriation bill, may it now refuse
to so do? That is, can a valid and existing treaty be negated by Congressional
refusal to appropriate? The United States Supreme Court in DeLima v. Bidwell,
182 U. S. 1 at 198, 21 S. Ct. 743, 45 L. Ed. 1041 at 1056 (1901), said: "We express
no opinion as to whether Congress is bound to appropriate the money . . . in this
case, as Congress made prompt appropriation of the money stipulated in the treaty."
To date, no case in point has arisen but, if Congress should decide to defy the
President, may it not, through its control of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, also oust that body of jurisdiction over such a private case? See
Laski, op. cit., p. 167, quoted in note 36, ante. On the effect of revenue laws, apart
from the purse-string concept of effectuation, and the treaty-making power, see
Willoughby, Constitutional Law (1929), Vol. 1, p. 558.
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Still another question remains for examination. Speaking in
terms of Congress versus a treaty, it has been said that the latest
expression overrides the earlier. But, can Congress legislate on
everything or is its power in the field of legislation subject to
limitation? It, without doubt, possesses certain "enumerated"
powers with respect to legislation,3 8 for the exercise of which it
does not depend upon a treaty and with regard to which it in-
dependently enjoys a constitutional justification. But the states
likewise have their own powers which, under the Tenth Amend-
ment, are "reserved" to them except insofar as these powers have
been delegated to the United States or have been prohibited by
the Constitution. 9 In theory, therefore, the Congress cannot in-
vade the state's powers and if it attempted to do so, as by the en-
actment of laws concerning marriage or the adoption of children,
it would be acting in an unconstitutional fashion. Within the
sphere of the enumerated powers, Congress may unquestionably
exercise its authority when, and if, it desires to enact legisla-
tion to effectuate treaties for the power would exist independ-
ently of the treaty. But suppose no enumerated power is found,
or some exercise of the states' "reserved" power is necessary
for effectuation,-what then? In other words, can a treaty be-
come the basis for a Congressional power not found in the
Constitution?
Two possible situations are presented. Under one of them,
no reserved powers of the states would be involved, but an ab-
sence of express power in the Congress may be noted. Under
the other, no express powers having been granted to Congress,
the states' reserved powers could be involved. In the first of
these situations, the Congress, acting on the basis of the "neces-
sary and proper" clause, 40 has legislated so as to effectuate
treaties and the Supreme Court has approved this exercise of
power." In the second situation, however, the states' rights or
38 The "enumerated" powers are listed in U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, clauses 1-17.
39 See, in general, Jackson, "The Tenth Amendment Versus The Treaty Power,"
14 Va. L. Rev. 331 (1928).
40 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
41 As to the extradition of fugitives to effectuate treaty provisions, see 18 U. S.
C. § 3181 et seq. The power to punish private acts of violence In a state where
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powers would be "impaired" or "diminished" or, at the very
least, slighted. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has seen fit to
uphold congressional legislation and the famous Migratory Bird
case serves as a basis for this statement.
The case last mentioned, that of Missouri v. Holland,42 dealt
with a 1916 treaty between Great Britain and this country for the
reciprocal protection of migratory birds making seasonal flights
between Canada and the United States. Before the two nations
had so acted there had been earlier and independent Congres-
sional efforts to regulate but these bad been denounced,43 for
which reason the treaty under consideration had been entered
into.44  Congress then legislated, 45 acting under the treaty and
the "necessary and proper" clause, to give the Secretary of Ag-
riculture power to regulate the hunting of the migratory birds,
subject to the penalties provided in the statute. Mr. Justice
Holmes, writing an opinion for the United States Supreme Court,
which had voted to uphold the legislation, stated that "the na-
tional well being" required "national action" when the states
"individually are incompetent to act."
46
aliens are deprived of treaty rights is discussed in Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S.
678, 7 S. Ct. 656, 30 L. Ed. 766 (1887). For a statute conferring judicial power
upon American consuls stationed abroad, see In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, 11 S. Ct.
897, 35 L. Ed. 581 (1891).
42252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920). The decision was early
criticized in Black, "Missouri v. Holland-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to
Absolutism," 25 Ill. L. Rev. 911 (1931).
43 See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (1915), and United States v.
Shauver, 214 F. 154 (1914), for prosecutions under an earlier statute.
44 Mr. Justice Holmes referred to the point in a paragraph which also gives the
main argument against Congressional exercise of powers under a treaty which it
did not possess beforehand. He wrote: "It is said that a treaty cannot be valid
if it infringes the Constitution; that there are limits, therefore, to the treaty-making
power: and that one such limit is that what an act of Congress could not do
unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the states, a treaty cannot do.
An earlier act of Congress that attempted, by itself, and not in pursuance of a
treaty, to regulate the killing of migratory birds within the states, had been
held bad . . . . The same argument is supposed to apply now with equal force."
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 at 432, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 at 647.
45 The treaty contained an agreement that both powers would take or propose to
their legislatures the necessary measures for effectuating its provisions. Pursuant
thereto, the statute of July 3, 1918, 16 U. S. C. § 703 et seq., was passed.
46 252 U. S. 416 at 433, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 at 648. Compare this with
the like reasons given for upholding the unemployment tax provisions of the Social
Security Act. Justice Cardozo, in Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U. S. 548 at 586, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81 L. Ed. 1279 at 1291 (1937), speaking for a bare
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Nothing in the Constitution specifically prohibited the stat-
ute,47 continued Holmes, and the only question was whether it
was "forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms
of the Tenth Amendment." Since a national interest of "very
nearly the first magnitude" was involved, and protection could
be accomplished only by "national action in concert with that
of another power," Congress had power so to act, especially since
the subject matter was "only transitorily within the State" and
had no "permanent habitat therein." Pointing to the fact that,
but for the treaty and the statute, there soon might be no birds
for any powers to deal with, he expressed the belief that "nothing
in the Constitution . . . compels the Government to sit by while
a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our
crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States.
The reliance is vain. .. . ,,48
III. THE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
Separate and apart from the treaty-making power is another
which results in the formation of what are called "executive"
agreements 9 The Constitution does not jumble "treaties," "com-
pacts, " ' agreements," "conventions," and the like into one mass,
majority, remarked: "The fact developed quickly that the states were unable to
give the requisite relief. The problem [of unemployment] had become national
in area and dimensions. There was need of help from the nation if the people
were not to starve."
47 "If the treaty is valid," wrote Holmes, "there can be no dispute about the
validity of the statute under article 1, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to
execute the powers of the government." 252 U. S. 416 at 432, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L.
Ed. 641 at 647.
48 252 U. S. 416 at 435, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 at 648. Illustrations of other
types of treaties, such as the one with the Indian tribes concerned in The Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U. S. (5 Pet.) 1, 8 L. Ed. 25 (1831), are not here discussed.
49 See, in general, McClure, International Executive Agreements (1941); Borchard,
"Treaties and Executive Agreements-A Reply," 54 Yale L. J. 616 (1945); Brandon,
"Analysis of the Terms 'Treaty' and 'International Agreements,'" 47 Am. J. Int'l L.
46 (1953); Satterfield, "Constitutional Amendment by Treaty and Executive
Agreement," 24 Miss. L. J. 280 (1953) ; Welch, "Treaties and Executive Agreements,"
41 Ill. B. J. 93 (1953) ; and a note entitled "International Agreements Other Than
Treaties," in 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 147. Since the Constitution was adopted, approxi-
mately 1,000 treaties and 2,600 executive agreements have been concluded, but
unpublished executive agreements are not included in this count. According to
Secretary of State Dulles, these number into the thousands.
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but neither does it define or distinguish them beyond question.50
The source of the power to make executive agreements is one
question; the manner of its exercise is another.
Three possible sources may be found, to-wit: (1) the Presi-
dent's independent constitutional power as commander in chief
and as the federal organ for foreign relations, (2) legislative
delegation to the President from among those powers which Con-
gress possesses, and (3) based on treaties. It is usually the
second of these sources which has been regarded as the accepted
basis for an executive agreement, but the others may not be
thereby disregarded.51 For example, in Tucker v. Alexandroff,
52
five of the justices pointed out that no legislation authorized a
series of agreements with Mexico, made between 1882 and 1896,
permitting each country to pursue marauders across the border.53
Nevertheless, they felt that such a power "was probably assumed
to exist from the authority of the President as commander in
chief." On the other hand, four of the justices felt that presi-
dential action of this nature required an express treaty or statute.
These "executive" executive agreements, based on the first
50 See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U. S. (14 Pet.) 540 at 570 and following, 10 L. Ed.
579 at 594 (1840), where Chief Justice Taney attempted so to do. Mr. Dana Backus,
Chairman of the Committee on International Law of the City Bar Association,
testifying in 1952 on the predecessor of S. J. Res. 1, said: "I have difficulty in
determining . . . the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement,
whether one should be a treaty or an executive agreement, or can we Insist upon it
being a treaty?" See Hearings, Subcommittee of Senate Judiciary Committee, 82nd
Cong., 2nd Sess., "Treaties and Executive Agreements," p. 82.
51 Crandall, op. cit., Ch. VIII; McClure, op. cit., Ch. I and II, for agreements
entered into upon the basis of the President's own powers; Holmes v. Jennison,
39 U. S. (14 Pet.) 540, 10 L. Ed. 579 (1840).
52 183 U. S. 424, particularly pp. 435 and 467, 22 S. Ct. 195, 46 L. Ed. 264,
particularly pp. 269 and 281 (1902).
53 Similar agreements have been made, in time of war, between our commanding
generals and others, or by the President, as commander in chief, with other nations.
The Korean executive agreement to receive the 22,000 anti-Communist prisoners
who refused expatriation or the Berlin agreement partitioning the city are but
illustrations. It might be noted that, of the ten conflicts in which the United States
has participated, five came about without a Congressional declaration of war: the
Korean "war," the United States-Mexican hostilities of 1914-17, the French naval
war of 1798-1800, the first Barbary war of 1801-5, and the second one of 1815. On the
other hand, five were declared by Congress: the two World Wars, the Mexican and
Spanish-American wars, and the one with England in 1812. Congressional declara-
tion would not be required when the United States is attacked, as at Pearl Harbor,
and it would be superfluous to give the President a power to repel an invader by
any means at his command. The declaration would be required, however, if other
powers were to be granted by delegation.
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of the abovementioned sources, as distinguished from the "legis-
lative" executive agreements of the second type, have been used
by McKinley,5 4 Theodore Roosevelt,55 Wilson, 6 and Franklin
Roosevelt,57 although it is true that, under the last-named presi-
dent, they mushroomed in number to a point where they threatened
to replace treaties as the basis for American foreign policy. In
the famous case of United States v. Pink,5 1 decided in 1942, the
Litvinov "executive" agreement of 1933 was held to be "final
and conclusive on the courts" insofar as Soviet recognition had
there been accorded. The court further reasoned that, since a
treaty is the supreme law of the land and such "international
compacts and agreements . . . have a similar dignity,'' 59 state
law had to yield if it was inconsistent with, or impaired the policy
or provisions of, a treaty or of an international compact or agree-
ment. In that fashion, although the "supremacy" clause declared
that only the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof, and
treaties made under the government's authority, were the su-
preme law, independently arrived at "executive" agreements were
judicially assigned a place of equality with laws and treaties.
60
Even more challenging in effect was the 1940 series of executive
agreements with Canada and Great Britain, following on the
collapse of France, which established.a Permanent Joint Board on
54 See illustrations and discussions in Crandall, op. cit., p. 103; Willoughby,
op. cit., Vol. I, p. 539; and Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations
(1922), p. 245.
55 McClure, op. cit., p. 98; Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (1925),
p. 112 et seq.
56 McClure, op. cit., p. 99 et seq.
57 His first important agreement was the Lltvinov one of 1933 whereby recogni-
tion was accorded to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was upheld in
United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 at 330-2, 57 S. Ct. 758, 81 L. Ed. 1134 at
1139 (1937), where Justice Sutherland said the President was "the sole organ" in
international relations and that these executive agreements constituted an inter-
national compact.
58 315 U. S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 (1942). This case involved the same
Litvinov agreement discussed In the Belmont case, mentioned in the preceding
footnote. The reasoning in the earlier case was reaffirmed and emphasized. The
narrow holding in the Pink case should be limited to the overriding of state laws
by executive agreements. The question still remains whether such agreements could
operate to override prior federal laws. On this, see note 62, post.
59 315 U. S. 203 at 230, 62 S. Ct. 552, 86 L. Ed. 796 at 818.
60 This alleged interchangeability of treaties and executive agreements has caused
McDougal and Lans to remark that the former is now a "sort of constitutional
vermiform appendix." See their "Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presi-
dential Agreements," 54 Yale L. J. 181 at 534-5 (1945).
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Defense and led to the exchanging of fifty overage destroyers for
a 99-year lease on British naval bases.6 1 By these agreements,
American strict neutrality became changed to something in the
nature of belligerency. Even better known, but also more con-
demned, among the secret war and post-war "executive" agree-
ments are those made at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, with at
least one eminent authority asserting the claim that such execu-
tive agreements should bind only the signing president.
62
Those compacts designated as "legislative" executive agree-
ments, i. e., agreements made by the executive department but de-
riving their power from Congressional delegation, are probably
the ones least known but those most frequently concluded. These
were first entered into with reference to the postal service 3 but
have been carried over into such areas as reciprocal trade and
the like. The Supreme Court has upheld these delegations to
the President,64 and has said that, for purposes of federal court
jurisdiction, such agreements, while not technically treaties re-
quiring ratification, nevertheless were treaties within the mean-
61 U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, grants to Congress the "power to dispose of...
property belonging to the United States." No judicial decision has been rendered
upon the question of whether President Roosevelt thereby exceeded his powers or
whether, independently, as commander In chief, he had power over such property
in war time. The closest judicial approximation, albeit indirect, is to be found in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 at 330, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80
L. Ed. 688 at 702 (1936).
62 See Borchard, op. cit.. and also his "Shall the Executive Agreement Replace
the Treaty?" 53 Yale L. J. 664 (1944). The Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether an executive agreement will override a prior federal statute but it may
soon do so. In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F. (2d) 655 (1953), Chief
Judge Parker's forceful opinion held it would not. The Supreme Court has granted
certiorari: - U. S. -, 74 S. Ct. 135, 98 L. Ed. (adv.) 81 (1953). In that case, the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1948 delegated to the President, after ordinarily
lengthy Tariff Commission hearings, the power to impose import quotas and duties.
By an executive agreement with Canada, an embargo placed on potato imports
from it, except for seed purposes, short-cut these hearings. The defendant Imported
potatoes. ostensibly for seed, but sold the same for food. The government sued to
recover its loss in support payments. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held the short-cut was unsupported by any independent or delegated authority. The
Attorney General is now arguing that the 1948 statute contained a specific provision
to the effect that treaties and executive agreements might be made to carry out the
purposes of the statute. The Supreme Court could peg its determination on this
fact and thereby find the existence of a delegated power leading to the making of a
"legislative" executive agreement.
63 McClure, op. cit., p. 38. The President, in June, 1950, sent troops into Korea
under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council pursuant to an executive
agreement not previously submitted to Congress for approval. See note 15, ante.
64 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892).
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ing of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act.": The spectacular Lend-
Lease Act of 1941 furnishes another illustration. By it, Congress
empowered the President to authorize his departmental heads to
procure defense items and to sell, lend, or lease them to friendly
nations. Pursuant thereto, executive "mutual aid" agreements
were entered into leading to the furnishing of over forty billions
of dollars worth of munitions and other items to American allies.
While the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 also authorizes
the President to enter into special agreements with the Security
Council,6" nothing thereunder has eventuated to date.
6 7
IV. RECENT EFFORTS TO AMEND TiHE TREATY POWER,
Dissatisfaction with certain of the events and consequences
here noted has provoked recent efforts to bring about some form
of amendment in the treaty-making power. The first Congressional
effort to amend " the Constitution began with S. J. Res. 130,
sponsored by Senator Bricker and fifty-nine other Senators, in-
troduced into the Second Session of the 82nd Congress on Feb-
ruary 7, 1952. Extended hearings were held69 but, the resolution
expiring with the Congress, a new S. J. Res. 1 was introduced
at the First Session of the 83rd Congress on January 7, 1953, this
time sponsored by sixty-four Senators. Again extended hear-
ings were held and, on June 8, 1953, by an 8-4 vote, the Senate
Judiciary Committee recommended a revised text for adoption.70
65 Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 58 at 601, 32 S. Ct. 593, 56 L. Ed. 894
at 910 (1912).
66 See note 15, ante, for details.
67 The objection to "secret" war and post-war agreements resulted in the passage
of P. L. 821, 81st Cong., approved Sept. 23, 1950, which requires all treaties and
other international agreements to be published by the Secretary of State separately
from the Statutes at Large.
68 The President, of course, has no constitutional role in the amending process
except as he may make recommendations on the point in his messages to Congress.
69 See note 50, ante, for citation. Space requirements prevent quotation from
this document or with respect to the other proposals.
70 Numerous other resolutions were introduced, both in the Senate and in the
House, all of which were considered, generally as well as in principle, by the Senate
Judiciary Committee. See, for example, S. J. Res. 2, a re-introduction by Senator
McCarran of his prior S. J. Res. 122, and S. J. 43. House Resolutions were num-
bered 7, 1-2, 25, 28, 32, 57, 65, 79, 84, and 141, respectively. The reasons for the
variety, and for their sponsorship by different organizations, are not here discussed.
The text of the resolution recommended by the Senate Judiciary Committee was
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The proposed amendment consisted of five sections, with the
important first three sections reading as follows:
1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Consti-
tution shall not be of any force or effect.
2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the
United States only through legislation which would be valid
in the absence of a treaty.
3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and
other agreements with any foreign power or international or-
ganization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limi-
tation imposed on treaties by this article.
The fourth section purported to empower Congress to enforce
the amendment by appropriate legislation, and the fifth specified
a seven-year period for ratification.
It will be quickly noticed that Section 1 is, in effect, little
more than a codification of constitutional law doctrines as es-
poused in the form of dicta by the Supreme Court, while Section
3 includes "executive and other agreements" within the purview
of Congressional regulation. Such agreements, however, are not
alone those with "any foreign power," i.e., another nation, but
also include any with an "international organization," for exam-
ple, the United Nations. 71 Such agreements would, under the
amendment, hereafter come within the limitations imposed by
Sections 1 and 2.
The Second Section requires more careful consideration to
realize its full import. Self-executing treaties, and also non-self-
executing treaties which have been effectuated by legislation, pres-
apparently a revision of one suggested by the American Bar Association, introduced
by Senator Watkins as S. J. Res. 43. The Committee's comment was that the
resolution, "with slight and unsubstantial variations, now conforms to the American
Bar Association proposal . . . but will continue to be known as the Bricker
Amendment."
71 Senator Bricker, testifying on S. J. Res. 130, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 21,
stated: "The primary purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 130 is to prohibit the use
of the treaty as an instrument of domestic legislation, and to prevent its use as a
vehicle for surrendering national sovereignty. The necessity for this amendment
is shown by the activities of the United Nations and certain of Its specialized
agencies. There is practically no human activity which treaties now [May 21, 1952]
under consideration by the U. N. do not seek to regulate."
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ently become the supreme internal law of the land, overriding fed-
eral and state legislation and state constitutions but not the fed-
eral Constitution or subsequent federal legislation in conflict there-
with. This is "automatic" law, that is, nothing further is re-
quired to be done for a treaty to become domestic law once these
conditions have been met. In contrast, Section 2 says that, here-
after, a treaty would not become internal law except "through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty." This
is the so-called "which" clause. Two conditions subsequent are
there set forth, to-wit: (1) the enactment of legislation, and (2)
the constitutional validity thereof when measured without the
treaty as a basis. When these conditions have been complied with,
but not until then, the treaty would become internal law, serving
to override prior federal legislation, state constitutions, and
state legislation. Each of these conditions should now be examined.
As to the first, dealing with the necessity for legislation, it
is obvious that there could, hereafter, be no self-executing trea-
ties. 72 Each new treaty, regardless of its terms, would be treated
as the non-self-executing ones now are and, without subsequent
federal legislation, such treaties could not become internal law.
Congressional action, beyond the point of mere Senate concur-
rence, would hereafter be an essential concomitant to every ef-
fective exercise of the treaty-making power. But there is also
a further qualification, one brought into play by the second con-
dition, and that deals with the fundamental validity of any legis-
lation so enacted.
Regarding this second condition, it has been pointed out that
Congressional impotence because of lack of an enumerated power
has been overcome, in the past, by an exercise of the treaty power
plus resort to the "necessary and proper" clause. The case of
Missouri v. Holland7 3 whereunder an earlier Supreme Court de-
72 The arguments generally advanced for this Included one based on a fear that
state license requirements for professions might be overthrown. In the case of
treaties with Denmark, Greece, Israel, Japan and West Germany, however, the
Senate-adopted a reservation excluding aliens from practicing professions involving
public functions, health, or safety wherein a state license, limited to American
citizens, was required.
78 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641 (1920).
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cision was, in effect, overruled by the President and the Senate,
so illustrates. Under the amendment, this could no longer happen
for Congress would be powerless to control the hunting of mi-
gratory birds for lack of constitutional authority on the point
and no treaty could serve to plug the constitutional gap.
Nor, for that matter, under the Third Section of S. J. Res. 1,
could executive or other agreements be treated any differently.
Even war-time agreements would, conceivably, require Congres-
sional approval, assuming Congress possessed a constitutional
power on the point, despite the fact the agreement in question
might deal, for example, with the Canadian stationing of troops
to repel an attack upon the American coastline. In that instance,
the President, as commander in chief, might well claim a separate
and distinct constitutional power 7 4 to enter into "executive"
executive agreements, because the Second Section might be said
to relate only to "legislative" executive agreements. Within the
assumed situation, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly agree.
But how far the Court would permit additional extensions is, of
course, presently a matter of pure speculation. Nevertheless, the
possibility is one which may well be posed. Put differently, every
ratified treaty would become subject to litigation concerning its
constitutionality and, until a test case had upheld it, no nation
could rely upon the federal government's written word.
75
74 See, for example, the arguments of Chief Justice Vinson and the minority in
the Steel Seizure Cases, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U. S. 579,
72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952). The case, of course, dealt with a peace-time
situation. Absent this condition and despite a lack of Congressional authority, a
war-time President would probably be upheld with respect to any reasonable action
taken upon emergency grounds. It might be noted that the government did not
contend therein, as some commentators have inferred, that treaties formed the
basis of the presidential power exercised in the case. The reference in the govern-
ment's arguments to treaties was furnished to describe the overall picture within
which the President acted in an emergency situation to avert a national disaster.
75 Prof. Eagleton, in a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Jan. 30, 1954,
suggested that "international law holds the treaty, once ratified, to be binding
upon us." He would infer that, once a treaty has been ratified, its constitutionality
could not be inquired into. He overlooks two things: (1) a treaty is invalid if it
violates the Constitution and no special procedure need he set up for such determi-
nation, and (2) nations are presumed to be aware of the internal treaty-making
procedures of their national brethren, so that conditions subsequent, even as today,
are not new. See Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1943), Vol. V, p. 26
et seq. The practical, as differentiated from the legal, difficulties would be increased
by the proposed amendments, but this discussion is limited to the legal aspects of
the problem.
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One argument has been made to the effect that resort to the
"which" clause would require the consent of all forty-eight states
for, if a Missouri-Holland situation again occurred, invalid fed-
eral legislation could not penetrate into the domain of the states.
76
It is here suggested that even this approach assumes too much
and that much more than forty-eight consents would be required.
Assume the Missouri-Holland facts. 77  Under Section 2 of the
Resolution, a treaty could be entered into and eventually rati-
fied but would not become internal la.w until Congress legislated.
But, by it, prior legislation would have been overturned, so that
the treaty alone would afford no valid base. How, then, could
Congress now obtain this base? Assume all forty-eight states
unanimously legislated uniformly,--would this grant Congress the
necessary power ? Since the enumerated powers of Congress could
not be increased, for Section 2 is involved, save by a constitu-
tional amendment, and that would require prior action by a two-
thirds majority of both branches of Congress as well as the re-
quired degree of state approval, the unanimous state legislative
action would appear to be insufficient to sanction the federal legis-
lation. Such practical state unanimity might conceivably work,
but even so the "which" clause would freeze into a constitutional
mold all possibility of ever permitting a unanimous federal and
state team to work unless a constitutional amendment was adopted
for each treaty falling within the assumed situation. 78 In those
instances, not alone would favorable action by two-thirds of the
Senate present be needed to consent to the treaty but, in addition,
two-thirds of each House would, in effect, have to re-approve.
76 One group of opponents contended that the term "legislation," as used in Section
2 of S. J. Res. 1, would require enactments by all state legislatures, thereby giving
each state a "Russian" veto over everything. This, apparently, is not what Senator
Bricker had in mind for, in his revised proposal, he took the states entirely out of
the picture. It might be argued, of course, that he was forced to do so.
77 This suggestion is made merely for convenience. The State Department has
listed twelve treaties, consented to by the Senate, where the subject matter lies
outside the area of delegated Congressional powers, as for example a Bonn agree-
ment concerning the validation of bonds, another with the signers of NATO
regarding the status of their forces, and another concerning the status of NATO
itself.
78 This would go beyond the pre-Constitution days when, under the Articles of
Confederation, although Congress could enter into treaties, it could not compel their
observance by the states. Under U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10, the individual states are
powerless to enter into agreements or compacts directly with foreign governments.
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To the foregoing analysis must be added the fact that the
"which" clause would involve some degree of senatorial abdica-
tion of power, if not of prerogative. Today, as has been shown,
the Senate may, by a simple majority vote, attach a reservation
or amendment to a treaty making it non-self-executing, thereby
requiring subsequent legislation for domestic effectuation. Here-
after, under the Resolution, the Senate would have no such power
for, no matter what it did, the House would have to "get into
the act" inasmuch as a statute would be required in every case.
The arguments offered by the proponents and opponents of
S. J. Res. 1, or with respect to its offspring, go beyond the province
of this essay and are not further discussed. What is of interest is
the Senate action taken thereon. On February 15, 1954, by a
62-20 vote, the Senate approved the inclusion of the words "or
other international agreement" in the first section so that it then
read: "A provision of a treaty or other international agree-
ment which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any
force or effect." The following day, voting 72-16, the Senate
provisionally adopted a procedural proposition to the effect that
its consent to ratification of all future treaties should always
be by roll-call vote.1 9 On February 17th, by provisionally ap-
proving certain language by a 44-43 vote, the Senate disap-
proved, and officially eliminated, the amended Section 1 by sub-
stituting for the present treaty portion of the "supremacy"
clause a requirement that no treaty "shall be the supreme law of
the land unless made in pursuance of this Constitution." Treaties,
therefore, but not "executive" international agreements, would
be, in effect, the sole matter covered. According to various Wash-
ington commentators, President Eisenhower indicated that he had
no objection to the submission of such an amendment to the people.
The second section of the proposed amendment as originally
submitted, one which directed that a treaty, or agreement, would
require Congressional approval before becoming internal law,
was rejected on February 25th by a 50-42 vote, despite a rider
79 This, as discussed In note 14, ante, could be accomplished by a change In the
Senate's own Rule XXXVII.
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thereto, applying only to treaties, which would have permitted
them to become internal law without further action if the two-
thirds consenting should so declare. This vote therefore left
alive, out of the original proposal, the three substituted items men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph as well as Section 3, which
had not, to that point, been voted upon. On February 26th, by a
61-30 vote, the substitute amendment offered by Senator George
was adopted, thereby killing all these other items and presenting,
for final consideration, a single proposed amendment.
The proposal of Senator George consisted of four sections,
the last being the usual seven-year ratification requirement. Sec-
tion 1, identical in language with the previously-approved re-
quirement, recited: "A provision of a treaty or other inter-
national agreement which conflicts with this Constitution shall
not be of any force or effect." Section 2 related only to in-
ternational agreements and required Congressional action to make
them effective as internal law. Section 3, in effect, was the previ-
ously-approved roll-call provision. Immediately after replacing
this substitute for the others, the Senate, voting 60-31, then de-
feated the new, and only surviving, proposal by a one-vote mar-
gin.80 This was the last required vote upon any remaining Sen-
ate proposal but, on March 2nd, 1954, Senator Lennon (D., N. Car.),
who had been paired for the proposal, filed a motion to have the
Senate reconsider and reverse itself, a motion designed to lead
to a possible approval of the George amendment. The status
of the Great Debate of 1954 is, therefore, one of uneasy quiet for,
so long as the Senate is in session, the Lennon motion could be
called up for a vote at any time.
What is of greater interest and importance is the matter of
the future composition of the Senate for the next session. Of
the sixty-four original sponsors of S. J. Res. 1, nine of the eleven
who voted against even the watered-down George proposal came
from the Eastern seaboard. The fall elections of 19,54 must, there-
fore, be examined not only for party nominees and candidates'
s0 The two-thirds provision required 61 favorable votes out of 91 voting. There
was also a pairing of two for and one against.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
platforms but, ultimately, for the people's choice. The next Con-
gress should be able to start anew but, with the experience of
this year's battle, assuming a revived George proposal would
still be unacceptable, the question will then be whether an even
weaker compromise substitute would be proposed. If so, could it
be said that an amendment to the Senate rules, so as to require
a formal roll-call on all treaty votes, and a statement of a stand-
ard procedure for consents, as, for example, a clause stating that
neither the treaty nor its operation should affect or involve in-
ternal law, would suffice?
It should be noted that most of the heat engendered during
the Great Debate has been brought about by what has been
styled the "executive" executive agreement, for the Senate is
able to control treaties and "legislative" executive agreements
through its constitutional power to consent or to join with the
House in the enactment of legislation. The "executive" execu-
tive agreement cannot, as has 1)een shown, be constitutionally im-
paired by the Congress for, in this sphere, the President acts by
virtue of his constitutional authority. Restrictions upon, or dim-
inution in, such executive power could be accomplished only by
an amendment to the Constitution. The basic problem, then, is to
determine the mischief or defect for which the law does not pro-
vide,"' to determine whether it threatens to eventuate, 2 and then,
assuming it is apt to occur, to decide whether the mischief would
be so great as to sufficiently outweigh those other evils which
might result from a constitutional amendment or whether it would
be better to leave well enough alone.
8 3
81 The "mischief" rule for interpreting statutes was enunciated by Blackstone,
Comm., I, 87, on the basis of Heydon's Case, 3 Coke 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (1584).
It was followed in American Historical Society, Inc. v. Glenn, 248 N. Y. 445, 162
N. E. 481 (1928). See also statement of Mr. Justice Stone in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U. S. 469 at 489, 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L. Ed. 1311 at 1321 (1940).
82 This, of course, has been the procedure advocated by the courts in applying
the "clear and )resent danger" test. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 4,94,
71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. Ed. 1137 (1951), however, the Supreme Court adopted the
approach of Judge Learned Hand. He wrote: "In each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion [here of constitutional executive power] as is necessary to avoid the
danger." See 183 F. (2d) 201 at 212.
83 The "balancing" concept, akin to the utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill
and his predecessors in England, has been utilized in American politics and juris-
prudence for generations. It partakes, too, of the pragmatic consequence-approach
as well as of the "down-to-earth" school of American realism.
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Obviously, this procedure would require a non-emotional ap-
proach. Aside from the matter of adoption or rejection of an
amendment, policy questions will always intrude as the issue con-
cerns the effect such an amendment would have on the success
or failure of American interests both at home and abroad. Part
of the answer may be found in a proper evaluation of the mis-
chiefs and evils, if any, in the present system, but the importance
of the issue on the national well-being calls for a double consid-
eration. On this suggested basis for evaluation there should be
no disagreement. On the evaluation itself, honest disagreement
could result. In that conclusion, however, whatever the conclusion
may be, responsible Americans will join as they act within the
framework of democratic procedures.
